The Power Problem: Why Cutting Electricity to Fordow Isn't a Simple Solution

In recent years, discussions about preventing Iran’s nuclear advancement have frequently centered on the possibility of attacking power infrastructure as a less destructive alternative to direct military strikes ¹². The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, buried deep beneath a mountain near Qom, represents one of the most challenging targets in Iran’s nuclear program ³⁴. While disrupting electricity might seem like an elegant solution to halt uranium enrichment without the complications of bombing a hardened facility, the reality is far more complex ⁵⁶.

An aerial view and detailed breakdown of the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, showing its underground and mountainous location.

Fordow: The Underground Fortress

The Fordow nuclear facility, officially the Shahid Ali Mohammadi Nuclear Facility, is one of Iran’s most strategically important and well-protected nuclear sites ¹³. Located approximately 30 kilometers north of Qom, this enrichment plant is buried approximately 80-90 meters (260-295 feet) underground within a mountain range ²⁴. This depth provides natural protection against most conventional airstrikes and makes it virtually impenetrable to all but the most powerful bunker-busting weapons ³⁷.

Unlike the more accessible Natanz facility, which Israel successfully targeted in 2021 and 2025, Fordow was specifically designed to withstand attacks ⁵⁶. The facility is believed to house approximately 3,000 centrifuges in its underground halls, capable of enriching uranium to high purity levels ³². In early 2023, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported finding uranium particles at Fordow enriched to almost 84% purity, which approaches the 90% threshold required for weapons-grade material ⁵⁷.

Cross-Section of Fordow: Challenges of Attacking a Hardened Facility

How Uranium Centrifuges Work

Understanding why power disruption might be considered a strategic option requires knowledge of how uranium enrichment works ⁸⁹. Centrifuges are sophisticated machines that separate uranium isotopes through high-speed rotation ¹⁰¹¹. The process uses uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), which is spun at supersonic speeds to separate the lighter uranium-235 isotope from the heavier uranium-238 ¹⁰¹².

These centrifuges must maintain precise rotational speeds, often exceeding 90,000 RPM (1,500 revolutions per second) ¹¹¹³. At such velocities, any sudden disruption in power can have catastrophic effects on the delicate equipment ⁹¹⁴. When power is cut suddenly, centrifuges don’t simply stop—they go through a complex deceleration process that can result in severe mechanical damage if not properly controlled ¹⁵¹⁶.

Diagram: Impact of Power Outage on Uranium Centrifuges

The Vulnerability of Centrifuges to Power Disruption

Centrifuges are particularly vulnerable to sudden power loss for a specific technical reason ¹⁷¹⁵. As a centrifuge slows down after losing power, it passes through various resonance frequencies—specific speeds at which the rotor begins to vibrate violently ¹⁸¹⁹. Without controlled deceleration managed by frequency converters, these vibrations can cause the high-speed rotors to become unbalanced, hit the outer casing, and essentially self-destruct ¹⁵¹⁸.

This vulnerability was dramatically demonstrated in April 2021 when a suspected sabotage operation caused a blackout at Iran’s Natanz facility ²⁰¹⁹. The sudden power loss reportedly damaged numerous centrifuges, significantly setting back Iran’s enrichment capabilities for months ¹⁷²⁰. Former head of Iran’s atomic energy organization, Fereydoon Abbasi Davani, later acknowledged that the attack had targeted both the main power system and its backup, calling it “technically beautiful” from the perspective of the attackers ²¹¹⁹.

Impact of Power Disruption Types on Uranium Centrifuges

Why Fordow Is Different

While the power vulnerability strategy proved effective at Natanz, Fordow presents a significantly more challenging target for several reasons ⁷²². First, its mountain location makes physical access to power infrastructure more difficult ³⁴. Second, Iranian officials have learned from previous attacks and likely implemented enhanced protection for critical power systems at their most valuable nuclear site ⁷²³.

Most importantly, security experts believe Fordow has extensive backup power systems, potentially including multiple independent power sources, emergency generators, and uninterruptible power supplies specifically designed to prevent the catastrophic sudden shutdown of centrifuges ²²²⁴. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, noted that to effectively target Fordow’s centrifuges through power disruption, attackers would need to simultaneously disable both the external power grid and “the emergency system, which is deep inside the plant” ²²²⁵.

Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: Comparative Analysis

Iran’s Power Grid Vulnerabilities

Iran’s power infrastructure does present potential vulnerabilities that could theoretically be exploited ²³²⁶. The country faces significant challenges with its aging electrical grid, with frequent blackouts becoming more common in recent years ²⁷²⁸. According to state-run media in May 2025, Iran was experiencing an “imbalance of about 20,000 megawatts” in its power system, creating a nationwide electricity crisis ²⁸²⁹.

This systemic weakness has even impacted industrial operations, with some reports indicating that power shortages have halted up to 50% of Iran’s industries at times ²⁷²⁹. While these vulnerabilities exist within the broader Iranian power grid, critical facilities like Fordow almost certainly operate with prioritized power supply and multiple layers of backup systems ²⁸³⁰.

Map of Iran’s key petroleum sector facilities and infrastructure as of 2004, including oil and gas fields, pipelines, and processing plants.

Lessons from Previous Attacks

The history of attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities provides valuable insights into both the potential effectiveness and limitations of power-targeted strategies ³¹²⁰. The most famous attack, the Stuxnet computer worm discovered in 2010, specifically targeted the frequency converters controlling centrifuge speeds at Natanz, causing approximately 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges to fail by making them spin at damaging speeds while reporting normal operations to monitoring systems ³¹³².

In April 2021, a more direct attack on Natanz’s power systems demonstrated that even with advances in protection, well-planned operations could still effectively damage centrifuges through power manipulation ²⁰¹⁹. Israel’s 2025 strikes on Natanz took this approach further, destroying not only the electrical infrastructure but also the emergency power supply, backup generators, and above-ground facilities ¹⁷³³.

However, despite these successful precedents, Fordow has remained largely unscathed throughout these escalations ²⁴. The IAEA reported that while Natanz suffered severe damage in the 2025 strikes, “No damage has been observed at Fordow Enrichment Plant” ⁴⁷. This reinforces the assessment that Fordow’s protection systems and backup power capabilities present a much more challenging target ⁷³³.

Timeline: Attacks on Iranian Nuclear Facilities (2010-2025)

Technical Challenges of Power Disruption

Any attempt to cut electricity to Fordow would face numerous technical obstacles ³⁰²⁴. First, attackers would need to identify and target all power sources feeding the facility, including main power lines, emergency generators, and backup systems ²²¹⁹. These systems are likely distributed and hardened against attacks, with critical components such as emergency generators potentially housed deep underground alongside the centrifuges ²⁴²⁵.

Even if external power were cut, modern nuclear facilities implement sophisticated uninterruptible power supplies and automated safety protocols designed to enable controlled shutdown of sensitive equipment ¹⁶³⁴. Iranian nuclear engineers, having experienced previous attacks, have likely implemented multiple redundant systems specifically designed to prevent the catastrophic resonance effects that damaged centrifuges at Natanz ¹⁷¹⁸.

Additionally, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which has connections to the nuclear program, maintains strict security around critical infrastructure and likely has contingency plans for rapid power restoration ²³²⁶. Their deployment of Russian S-300 air defense systems above Fordow in 2016 further demonstrates their commitment to protecting this critical site from attacks ⁴⁷.

An illustrative diagram showing various critical components and their damping systems within a nuclear power plant, including emergency diesel generators.

Strategic and Diplomatic Implications

Beyond the technical challenges, attacking Iran’s power infrastructure to target Fordow carries significant strategic and diplomatic implications ³⁵³⁶. Any direct attack on Iranian soil—even one limited to power infrastructure—risks broader regional escalation and potential retaliation against Israel or other perceived adversaries ³⁵³⁷.

International reactions would likely be mixed, with many nations condemning attacks on civilian infrastructure even when connected to nuclear facilities ³⁶³⁸. The IAEA has consistently emphasized that “nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the context or circumstances, as it could harm both people and the environment” ³⁸³⁰. United Nations experts have similarly characterized attacks on nuclear facilities as “a flagrant violation of fundamental principles of international law” ³⁶³⁸.

From a strategic perspective, temporary disruption of enrichment capabilities might delay but not permanently halt Iran’s nuclear program ⁷³⁵. The question of whether such delays justify the risks remains contentious among security experts and policymakers ³⁹³⁷. As Matthew Kroenig of the Atlantic Council noted, the key strategic questions are: “What will happen in the coming weeks and months? Does Iran rebuild? Does Israel mow the grass? Or does Iran decide that it is not worth it to spend decades, and billions of dollars, and only have a pile of rubble to show for it?” ⁴⁰³⁷.

Aerial view of Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, nestled within a mountainous desert landscape.

Alternative Approaches

Given the significant challenges of attacking Fordow’s power infrastructure, security analysts have considered alternative approaches ²²³⁹. One option involves cyber operations similar to Stuxnet, which might potentially bypass physical defenses to target control systems ³¹⁴¹. However, Iran has significantly enhanced its cybersecurity measures since those attacks, making similar operations increasingly difficult ⁴¹³².

Diplomatic solutions through renewed nuclear negotiations remain another pathway ⁴²⁴³. European diplomats have continued to urge Iran to “continue their talks with the United States” despite recent escalations ⁴²⁴⁴. Following face-to-face meetings in Geneva in June 2025, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul reported that “the Iranian side is fundamentally ready to continue talking about all important issues” ⁴²⁴⁴.

Some experts argue that a comprehensive strategy might be necessary, potentially involving multiple approaches ³⁵⁴³. As David Albright suggested, “simply taking out Fordow would not stop Iran from using alternative sites to potentially produce one or several nuclear weapons” ³⁵³⁹. This reality reinforces the assessment that there are no simple solutions to the complex challenge of addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions ³⁹⁴³.

Aerial view of Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility, highlighting its main underground construction area and surrounding infrastructure.

Conclusion

The concept of cutting electricity to Fordow as a means of halting Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities represents an appealing but ultimately flawed strategy ²²¹⁷. While power disruption has proven effective against less-protected sites like Natanz, Fordow’s mountain fortress design, likely redundant power systems, and Iran’s learning from previous attacks make it an exceptionally challenging target ⁷²².

The technical characteristics of uranium centrifuges do create a theoretical vulnerability to power disruption, but exploiting this vulnerability at a hardened facility like Fordow would require simultaneously neutralizing multiple backup systems in a highly protected environment ¹⁷²⁵. Such an operation would face significant obstacles and likely provide only temporary disruption at best ²²³³.

As tensions continue in the region, policymakers must weigh the limited potential benefits of power-targeted attacks against their considerable risks and diplomatic costs ³⁶³⁷. The Fordow power problem ultimately illustrates a broader truth about complex security challenges: apparent simple solutions often disguise more complicated realities that require comprehensive, multi-faceted approaches ³⁵³⁹.

Cross-section of an AP1000 nuclear reactor illustrating passive safety features designed to operate without external power.